The problem of evil asks how a good, all-powerful God can permit suffering, a question philosopher Hans Küng called the “rock of atheism.” Epicurus framed the core dilemma centuries ago: is God willing but unable to prevent evil, or able but unwilling? Defenders offer explanations including free will, soul-making through hardship, and divine purposes beyond human comprehension. While no single answer satisfies everyone, the debate explores whether suffering might serve spiritual ends that remain partially hidden from our view.
How can a good and all-powerful God permit suffering to exist in the world? This question, known as the problem of evil, has challenged believers and philosophers for millennia, forming what theologian Hans Küng called the rock of atheism. The puzzle originates with the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus, who asked whether God is willing but unable to prevent evil, suggesting impotence, or able but unwilling, implying malevolence.
The problem divides into two categories of suffering. Moral evil stems from human choices like cruelty and violence, while natural evil arises from disasters such as earthquakes and disease. Together, these forms of suffering create what many consider the strongest argument against divine existence.
The logical version presents a straightforward syllogism: if an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God existed, evil would not exist, yet evil clearly does exist, consequently such a God does not.
Philosophers have refined this challenge over centuries. Plato linked evil to human laziness, ignorance, and self-indulgence. Early Christian thinkers like Clement of Alexandria and Augustine adopted a different view, describing evil as merely the absence of good rather than a substance itself.
Augustine’s Enchiridion formally articulated this privation theory, arguing that evil represents a lack rather than a presence. Philosopher Marcus Singer challenged the common notion of necessary evil, arguing that evil cannot be necessary if it is truly evil, since anything genuinely necessary cannot qualify as evil.
Contemporary discussions focus less on logical contradictions and more on probability. The evidential problem questions whether the intense suffering observed in the world makes God’s existence unlikely. Many theologians draw on biblical themes such as righteous anger and endurance to argue that suffering can have spiritual significance.
Gratuitous evils, those appearing senseless or excessive, pose particular difficulty for belief in a loving deity. Scripture suggests that divine reasons for evil may exist even when humans remain unaware of God’s specific purposes in each case.
Defenders of theism offer several responses. The free will defense argues that genuine moral goodness requires the freedom to choose, which necessarily permits the possibility of harm.
Some theodicies propose that certain evils enable soul-making, allowing humans to learn and mature through hardship.
Others suggest that God’s reasons remain inscrutable to human understanding, operating within frameworks beyond our comprehension.
These responses do not claim to explain every instance of suffering but attempt to show that evil and divine existence need not be incompatible, leaving the debate unresolved yet philosophically active.
